The Centro-Leste Corridor (ES-MG-DF-GO) Challenges Brazil’s Railway Regression
- contato177592
- Jan 8
- 7 min read
The Central-Eastern Corridor is a logistical solution that stands out in Brazil’s limited railway infrastructure landscape, marked by nearly a century of stagnation, if not regression, in network extension. The country went from 30,000 km of active tracks in the 1920s to just over 12,000 km in full operation in the 2020s.
The few railway advances seen in the last 50 years have focused on commodity outflows. Examples include the Ferrovia do Aço (Steel Railway), between Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro, currently operated by MRS; the Carajás Railway, built by Vale do Rio Doce (now simply Vale), between Pará and Maranhão; and the Vicente Vuolo Railway, being expanded by Rumo in Mato Grosso.
Other projects, such as the North-South Railway, the Transnordestina, and the West-East Integration Railway (FIOL), still face challenges. The North-South Railway took over 30 years to connect the Northeast to the Southeast; the Transnordestina continues to progress but very slowly through the semi-arid Northeast; and the FIOL, despite its promising name, currently connects only a tiny region in southern Bahia, still lacking a port of its own.
One of the reasons for this historical delay is the political monopoly in railway planning, something completely challenged by the recent New Railway Law, on which the bold proposal of PetroCity’s Central-Eastern Corridor is based.
Since the creation of RFFSA in the 1950s, Brazilian railways have been planned with political interests, often disregarding demand and logistical rationality. Even post-RFFSA projects, such as Ferronorte, North-South, Transnordestina, and FIOL, were also strongly influenced by politics, prioritizing specific lobbies or electoral interests.
This political monopoly scenario completely changed in 2021 with the New National Railway Framework, which opened railway planning to economic rationality and market competition. In this context, PetroCity Group’s ambitious Central-Eastern Logistics Corridor emerges.
Central-Eastern Corridor Project Overview
The project encompasses 2,160 km of tracks, grouped from 4 railway authorizations, 11 dry ports (industrial and customs logistics centers), and a maritime port, integrating productive regions to Espírito Santo’s coastline.
Key characteristics of the railway authorizations forming the Central-Eastern Corridor:
• First authorization: 431 km between São Mateus (ES) and Ipatinga (MG), with cargo transshipment units (UTACs) in Barra de São Francisco and Governador Valadares.
• Second authorization: 1,188 km from Barra de São Francisco to Brasília (DF), passing through Montes Claros, Unaí, and other cities, named Juscelino Kubitschek Railway.
• Third authorization: 452 km from Brasília to Mara Rosa (GO), connecting to the FICO (Central-West Integration Railway).
• Fourth authorization: 70 km linking Anápolis (GO) to EF-355.
PetroCity has already secured substantial funding for these integrated projects, standing out not only for its ability to attract private resources but also for obtaining necessary public utility declarations for land expropriations to build railway infrastructure.
Among its notable partnerships is collaboration with international and national investors to participate in the railway sections. In this regard, the company signed significant agreements, such as a protocol of intent with the Minas Gerais government, signaling an investment of BRL 16.8 billion in railway construction solely within Minas Gerais.
Additionally, PetroCity has prioritized verticalizing its logistics operations, including investing nearly BRL 250 million in building tugboats for its future port in São Mateus. This investment signals both efficiency and cost reduction throughout the chain.
This vertical approach not only enhances the competitiveness of Brazilian products internationally by enabling more efficient and economical logistics but also serves as a practical example of economic development based on economic freedom principles and private initiative. Thus, PetroCity not only acts to promote Brazil’s logistical modernization but also reinforces the importance of business autonomy in creating infrastructure that directly responds to market demands.
Economic Benefits and Potential Logistical Improvements of the Central-Eastern Corridor
The project could boost the transport of grains, minerals, and other goods, as well as shift road freight to railways and cabotage. Estimated at an investment of BRL 23 billion, solely for the railway, which the company claims has an internal rate of return (IRR) of 14% and a 12-year payback period, the Central-Eastern Corridor has significant potential to generate thousands of jobs.
With the implementation of FICO and the Central-Eastern Corridor, Mara Rosa (GO) will become a major railway hub, almost equidistant from the main North, South, and East Arc ports, fostering competitiveness among the ports of Itaqui (MA), Santos (SP), and São Mateus (ES), with possible connection to Açu Port (RJ) via EF-118.
This strategic position makes Mara Rosa a central point for evaluating the logistical efficiency of different railway and maritime routes to international destinations, especially Europe and China.
Simulation Analysis for the Rotterdam Route (Europe)
Rotterdam, one of Europe’s largest ports and a gateway to the European market, is served by the three logistical corridors analyzed: via São Luís, São Mateus, and Santos. The table below summarizes the main variables for each route:
Origem | Via Porto | Distância Ferroviária (km) | Tempo Ferroviário (h) | Distância Marítima (km) | Tempo Marítimo (h) | Distância Total (km) | Tempo Mínimo Total (h) |
Mara Rosa | São Luís | 1.738 | 58 | 7.608 | 411 | 9.346 | 469 |
Mara Rosa | São Mateus | 1.812 | 60 | 9.012 | 487 | 10.824 | 547 |
Mara Rosa | Santos | 1.725 | 58 | 10.056 | 543 | 11.781 | 601 |
When destined for Europe, the Central-Eastern Corridor positions itself as an intermediate option between Itaqui and Santos, with the advantage of avoiding the notorious railway congestion at these two ports. While Itaqui faces supply limitations due to extensive railway use from Carajás’ ore trains, Santos suffers from congestion with grains from Mato Grosso and other cargoes from VLI and MRS.
Although the São Luís route is the most efficient in terms of total distance and time, combining a short railway journey with a direct maritime connection to Europe, the São Mateus route offers a competitive alternative, especially by avoiding congestion related to iron ore flow in Carajás.
The route via Santos, though functional, is the least advantageous due to its greater total distance and transport time, compounded by potential congestion at the Port of Santos.
Simulation Analysis for the Shanghai Route (China)
Shanghai, the epicenter of Asian trade, is also accessible via the three logistical corridors. The table below presents the analysis data:
Origem | Via Porto | Distância Ferroviária (km) | Tempo Ferroviário (h) | Distância Marítima (km) | Tempo Marítimo (h) | Distância Total (km) | Tempo Mínimo Total (h) |
Mara Rosa | São Luís | 1.738 | 58 | 20.533 | 1.109 | 22.271 | 1.167 |
Mara Rosa | São Mateus | 1.812 | 60 | 20.107 | 1.086 | 21.919 | 1.146 |
Mara Rosa | Santos | 1.725 | 58 | 20.476 | 1.106 | 22.201 | 1.164 |
When destined beyond the Cape of Good Hope, the Central-Eastern Corridor stands out. The São Mateus route is the most efficient for Asian and Western African transport, thanks to a slightly shorter maritime distance and the absence of additional costs like Panama Canal tolls.
The São Luís route is almost as efficient as São Mateus for China via the Panama Canal. However, this solution faces challenges of railway congestion in Carajás and waterway congestion in the Panama Canal itself, which has long struggled with reduced water capacity. Both contingencies could impact the competitiveness of the northern arc toward Asia and the Americas.
The Santos route offers performance similar to São Luís, but railway and port congestion in Santos makes it less advantageous than the Central-Eastern Corridor.
Logistical Simulations Interpretation and Implications
If implemented, the Central-Eastern Corridor could redefine Brazil’s logistical map. Its integration with productive regions of the Midwest, Minas Gerais, and Espírito Santo, combined with connections to competitive ports in Espírito Santo and Rio de Janeiro via EF-118, offers distinct advantages for different markets.
For Europe, although it is not as efficient as the São Luís route, for loads originating from FICO, the São Mateus route emerges as a promising alternative for Mato Grosso due to its independence from iron ore traffic.
For destinations east of the Cape of Good Hope, including Shanghai (China), the São Mateus route theoretically offers the best overall performance, balancing logistical efficiency and cost reduction for both nearby and FICO-origin loads.
With infrastructure planned to meet market demands, the project not only provides solutions for commodity outflow but also encourages shifting road freight to more sustainable and economical railway alternatives for domestic markets through rail and cabotage.
Moreover, the implementation of 11 dry ports and integration with existing railway networks will strengthen Brazil’s export capacity, increasing the competitiveness of national products in international markets.
The Central-Eastern Corridor is not just a new railway route but a catalyst for regional and national economic growth, promoting sustainable development and Brazil’s inclusion in global value chains more efficiently.
As this project progresses, Brazil is positioned to achieve new levels of logistical competitiveness, marking a historic milestone in the modernization of its railway infrastructure through a demand, logistics, and market-driven perspective.
Beyond regional growth, the Central-Eastern Corridor makes Brazil more competitive in the global market. Modern and efficient railway infrastructure allows Brazilian products to reach international markets like Europe, Africa, and Asia more quickly and at a lower cost via strategic ports.
This increase in logistical competitiveness can attract more direct foreign investments and strengthen Brazil’s position in global value chains—something Milton Friedman would likely applaud, given his support for policies promoting free trade and market efficiency.
Furthermore, the introduction of the Central-Eastern Corridor creates near-equidistance between the ports of São Luís, São Mateus, and Santos for cargo originating from FICO. This creates an interesting competitive scenario for both port and railway efficiency.
With almost equivalent internal distances, competition among these ports to attract shippers intensifies, significantly incentivizing small yet critical operational improvements. These include increasing the average speed of trains and optimizing port processes.
Ports and railway companies will be motivated to invest in technologies and practices that reduce waiting times, increase cargo handling capacity, and minimize logistical costs—all to stand out in this competition for efficiency and accessibility, attracting more shippers and consolidating their position in the export and import market for Midwest cargo.
MARCOS KLEBER RIBEIRO FÉLIX is a specialist in railway transportation and a legislative consultant for the Federal Senate of Brazil. He holds a Master’s degree in Transportation from the University of Brasília and is an engineer trained at the Military Institute of Engineering. He is the creator of the Railway Law and has expertise in legal engineering and consultancy.
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